

# **Safety Manual for VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid Automotive Vision Applications Processor**

## **User's Guide**



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# ***Safety Manual for VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid Automotive Vision Applications Processor***

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## **1 Scope**

This safety manual for the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device family products specifies the user's responsibilities for installation and operation in order to maintain the desired safety level.

This document contains:

- Product scope:
  - Purpose of product
  - Intended application sectors
  - Product safety constraints
- Information for each safety-related subsystem:
  - Functions, interfaces and parameters of each safety-related subsystem
  - Safety application overview
  - Life time, environment and application limits
  - Limits of application of each safety-related subsystem
  - Device built-in safety logic
  - User operation requirements to maintain the desired ASIL level, including a set of proof tests, diagnostic tests and test interval
- A summary of the user's responsibilities to integrate VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device family products into safety system.
- Safety-related characteristics
- Terms and definitions
- Document revision status

The following information is documented in the FMEDA and is not repeated in this document. For information on how to access the FMEDA, please contact your TI field representative.

- Summary of failure rates of the SoC estimated at the chip level
- Failure rates and diagnostic coverage for each sub-system
- Assumptions of use utilized in calculation of safety metrics

The user of this document should have a general understanding of the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device family products by having read the *TDA2x ADAS Applications Processor 23mm Package (ABC Package) Data Manual* (SPRS859) and the *TDA2x ADAS Applications Processor Silicon Revision 1.1 Technical Reference Manual* (SPRUHK5).

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## 2 Introduction

You, as a system and equipment manufacturer or designer, are responsible to ensure that your systems (and any TI hardware or software components incorporated in your systems) meet all applicable safety, regulatory and system-level performance requirements. All application and safety related information in this document (including application descriptions, suggested safety measures, suggested TI products, and other materials) is provided for reference only. You understand and agree that your use of TI components in safety critical applications is entirely at your risk, and that you (as buyer) agree to defend, indemnify, and hold harmless TI from any and all damages, claims, suits, or expense resulting from such use.

This safety manual provides information needed by system developers to assist in the creation of a safety critical system using a VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device. TI does not claim any compliance to any industry safety standard or Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL). The devices of this family are targeted to support systems which are QM and ASIL A. The Safety Manual specifies the user's responsibilities for installation and operation in order to maintain the desired safety level.

The following information is documented in the Detailed Safety Analysis Report for VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device and is not repeated in this document:

- Fault model used to estimate device failure rates suitable to enable calculation of customized failure rates
- Quantitative FMEA (also known as Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostics Analysis (FMEDA)) with detail to the submodule level of the device, suitable to enable calculation based on customized application of diagnostics

The user of this document should have a general familiarity with the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device. This document is intended to be used in conjunction with the device-specific data sheets, technical reference manuals, and other documentation for the products under development.

For more information regarding the Safety Report, contact your TI sales representative.

### 2.1 Product Scope

#### 2.1.1 Purpose of the Product

The purpose of the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device is to function as a digital signal processor (DSP) in embedded automotive applications in the driver assistance space. Some of these applications may be safety critical.

Multiple safety applications were analyzed during concept and design phase for this product in order to support Safety Element Out Of Context (SEooC) development according to ISO26262-10:2011. The product originally was not developed per ISO26262 standard process and hence qualifies as QM. At the same time, deliveries are made to customers to enable item (system) level safety analysis. These deliveries include the safety manual, the safety analysis reports and FMEDAs. No assumptions have been made in the safety analysis reports for whether a particular item will utilize a block of VisionSurround 28 Super/High/Mid or not. The report includes the failure rates for all the blocks without making any assumptions on the usage of that particular block for a given system. It is customer's responsibility to utilize the reports provided in context of their own usage and system requirements.

The VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device was not developed according to any existing safety standard and no compliance to these standards is claimed.

#### 2.1.2 Application Sectors

The VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device is intended to be usable in automotive Advanced Driver Assistance Systems. Specific targeted application segments include, but are not limited to:


- Front Camera
  - Land Departure Warning
  - Traffic Sign Recognition
  - High Beam Assist
  - Collision Mitigation

- Backup Camera
  - Obstacle Detection
  - Park Assist
- Surround View Systems
  - Ethernet Surround View
  - LVDS Surround View
- Radar
  - Long Range Radar
  - Short Range Radar

As this device is a general market rather than custom or bespoke product, it cannot be said that a specific implementation configuration can be assumed. As long as the requirements specified in this document are followed, the DSP can also be used in safety critical applications beyond the ones mentioned above.

### 2.1.3 Application Sectors

Figure 1 provides a very high-level overview of the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device.



- A To identify the correct configuration for the module in the block diagram, see the device-specific technical reference manual.

**Figure 1. High-Level Device Diagram**

- The device is composed of the following subsystems:
  - Cortex®-A15 microprocessor unit (MPU) subsystem
  - Digital signal processor (DSP) C66x subsystems
  - Image and video accelerator high-definition (IVA-HD) subsystem

- Cortex-M4 image processing unit (IPU) subsystem, including two ARM® Cortex-M4 microprocessors
- Embedded vision engine (EVE) subsystems
- Programmable real-time unit (PRU) subsystem
- Display subsystem (DSS)
- Video input capture (VIP)
- 3D-graphics processing unit (GPU) subsystem, including POWERVR SGX544 dual-core
- Debug subsystem
- The device provides a rich set of connectivity peripherals, including among others:
  - PCI Express Gen2 subsystem
  - Gigabit Ethernet (GMAC) subsystem
  - DCAN subsystems
- The device also integrates:
  - On-chip memory
  - External memory interfaces (EMIF)
  - Memory management
  - Level 3 (L3) and level 4 (L4) interconnects
  - Real-time clock (RTC)
  - General-purpose (GP) timers
  - Watchdog timer (WDT)
  - Interprocessor communication (Spinlocks, Mailboxes)
  - Multichannel audio serial port (McASP)
  - Serial peripheral interfaces (SPI)
  - Inter-integrated circuit (I2C) interfaces
  - Universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter (UART) modules
  - General-purpose input/output (GPIO)
  - System and serial control peripherals

The ADAS VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device is a high-performance, automotive vision application device based on enhanced OMAP™ architecture integrated on a 28-nm technology.

## 2.2 Product Safety Constraints

The VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device is not designed to meet any existing (IEC61508, ISO26262) or future safety standards. If the device is used in the context of functional safety, it has to be treated as a Quality Managed (QM) device.

Multiple safety applications were analyzed during concept and design phase for this product in order to support SEooC development according to ISO26262-10:2011. The product originally was not developed per ISO26262 standard process and qualifies as QM. At the same time, deliveries are made to customers to enable item (system) level safety analysis. These deliveries include the safety manual, the safety analysis reports and FMEDAs. No assumptions have been made in the safety analysis reports as to whether a particular item utilizes a block of VisionSurround 28 Super/High/Mid or not. The report includes the failure rates for all the blocks without making any assumptions on the usage of that particular block for a given system. It is the customer's responsibility to utilize the reports provided in context of their own usage and system requirements.

Since the VisionSurround 28 Super/High/Mid silicon is targeted for a variety of safety applications, there is no fixed FTTI that TI as a supplier could propose. It is the responsibility of the customer to utilize the methods and safety features outlined in the device-specific safety manual and technical reference manual to meet their own identified FTTI requirements.




### 3 TI Standard DSP Development Process

Texas Instruments has been developing products for the automotive applications for over twenty years. Automotive markets have strong requirements on quality management and high reliability of product. Though not explicitly developed for compliance to a functional safety standard, the TI standard DSP development process already features many elements necessary to manage systematic faults. This development process can be considered to be Quality Managed (QM), but does not achieve an IEC 61058 Safety Integrity Level (SIL) or ISO 26262 Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL).

The standard process breaks development into phases:

- Concept
- Commissioning
- Create
- Validation
- Ramp

The standard development process is illustrated in [Figure 2](#).



**Figure 2. TI Standard DSP QM Development Process**

## 4 Product Safety Architecture and User Requirements

### 4.1 Safety Function Overview

#### 4.1.1 Environment and Lifetime Limits

##### 4.1.1.1 Service Life

A useful lifetime, based on experience, should be assumed. The failure rate stated in the FMEDA only applies within the useful lifetime of the component. Beyond the useful lifetime, the result of the probabilistic calculation method is meaningless, as the probability of failure significantly increases with time. The useful lifetime is highly dependent on the subsystem itself and its operating conditions.

This assumption of a constant failure rate is based on the bathtub curve.

The VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid does not have any significant factors that are known to limit the useful lifetime. A 10 year useful lifetime can be assumed as a conservative measure. It is the responsibility of the manufacturer of a safety product utilizing the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid to determine any useful lifetime limitations of other components used in the product design and disclose them in their device-specific FMEDA and user manual.

When actual experience indicates a shorter useful lifetime than indicated in this section, the number based on actual experience should be used.

#### 4.1.1.2 Electrical Specifications and Environment Limits

The *Recommended Operating Conditions* section in the *TDA2x ADAS Applications Processor 23mm Package (ABC Package) Data Manual* (SPRS859) and the *PRCM Subsystem Environment* section in the *TDA2x ADAS Applications Processor Silicon Revision 1.1 Technical Reference Manual* (SPRUHK5) specify the environmental conditions.

The user should ensure these constraints are kept. Only the Q version device should be considered in the Automobile industry.

#### 4.1.1.3 Mechanical Environment Constraints

The constraints on mechanical, humidity, and temperature in the reflow oven are stated in AEC-Q100 Rev G. The user should ensure these constraints are kept.

#### 4.1.1.4 Operating Frequency Limits

The *Operating Performance Points* section in the *TDA2x ADAS Applications Processor 23mm Package (ABC Package) Data Manual* (SPRS859) specifies the operating performance point for processor clocks and device core clocks. The user should ensure these constraints are kept.

#### 4.1.1.5 Other Foreseeable Environment Disturbances

- Radiation

All the soft error rate (SER) calculations in the FMEDA are based on NYC sea level cosmic particles and ultra-low alpha emission package. The soft error caused by the cosmic particles needs to be reevaluated if this product applies to a higher altitude. For more details on failure rates at higher altitudes if necessary for your product safety analysis, contact your TI sales representative. This product is not allowed to be used in outer space safety applications. Failures due to protons and other heavy nuclei need to be considered in outer space. All TI failure rates driven by alpha particles are based upon the usage of ultra-low alpha mold compound in packaging (<0.002 alpha/(cm<sup>2</sup>hr)).

- EM Immunity

The ESD tolerance of this product is documented in the *Absolute Maximum Ratings* section of the *TDA2x ADAS Applications Processor 23mm Package (ABC Package) Data Manual* (SPRS859). Any ESD event higher than this limit may cause a permanent damage to the IC. The user is responsible to implement measures to prevent ESD events higher than the ESD tolerance limit. This product should not be exposed under any high frequency (>1 MHz) electric field larger than 400V/m or any magnetic field larger than 1.07A/m. Exposition to such a field may cause communication interrupt, soft error, hard error (can be recovered by a power cycle) or permanent damage to the IC. The user is responsible to implement shielding, grounding, filtering or other methods to ensure the electromagnetic field strength is under the limits mentioned above.

### 4.1.2 Safety Application Overview

The VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device is intended to be used in a number of safety critical automotive applications, for example, a single camera analytics system, a stereo camera analytics system, a surround view system, and so forth.

Figure 3 shows how a single camera analytics system could be realized using the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device. Figure 3 illustrates how the available sensors and varied integrations of supporting logic can result in multiple device interfaces, which must be considered safety critical to comprehend all common system implementations.






Figure 3. Single Camera Analytics System Block Diagram

Figure 4 shows how a stereo camera analytics system could be realized using the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device. Figure 4 illustrates how the available sensors and varied integrations of supporting logic can result in multiple device interfaces, which must be considered safety critical to comprehend all common system implementations.



**Figure 4. Stereo Vision System Block Diagram**

Figure 5 shows how an ethernet surround view system could be realized using the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device. Figure 5 illustrates how the available sensors and varied integrations of supporting logic can result in multiple device interfaces, which must be considered safety critical to comprehend all common system implementations.



**Figure 5. Ethernet Surround View Block Diagram**

## 4.2 Safety Function Requirements

### 4.2.1 Single Camera Analytics System

The following functions are considered safety critical in this safety analysis for the single camera analytics system for the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device:

- Power supply
- Clock generation (PLLs)
- Reset generation
- Processing elements (Cortex-A15, C66x, Cortex-M4, EVE)
- Internal read and write activity from different bus masters (CPUs, EDMA TPTCs + MMU, ...)
- OCMC Memory
- Transfer of data via the DDR interface
- Interprocessor communication (Mailbox, Spinlock)
- SPI communication to microcontroller
- Watchdog timer
- DCAN interface
- I2C interface
- Internal timers for operating system

Figure 6 shows the device block diagram with the safety functions for the single camera analytics system mapped to it. The red rectangles denote the blocks on which safety functions need to be mapped.





Figure 6. Block Diagram of Safety Functions for Single Camera Analytics System

#### 4.2.2 Stereo Camera Analytics System

In general, the following functions are considered safety critical in this safety analysis for the single camera analytics system for the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device:

- Power supply
- Clock generation (PLLs)
- Reset generation
- Processing elements (Cortex-A15, C66x, Cortex-M4, EVE)
- Internal read and write activity from different bus masters (CPUs, EDMA TPTCs + MMU, ...)
- OCMC memory
- Transfer of data via the DDR interface
- Interprocessor communication (Mailbox, Spinlock)
- SPI communication to microcontroller
- Watchdog timer
- DCAN interface
- I2C interface
- Internal timers for operating system
- Display subsystem (DSS)

Figure 7 shows the device block diagram with the safety functions for the stereo camera analytics system mapped to it. The red rectangles denote the blocks on which safety functions need to be mapped.



**Figure 7. Block Diagram of Safety Functions for Stereo Camera Analytics System**



### 4.2.3 Ethernet Surround View System

In general, the following functions are considered safety critical in this safety analysis for the single camera analytics system for the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device:

- Power supply
- Clock generation (PLLs)
- Reset generation
- Processing elements (Cortex-A15, C66x, Cortex-M4, EVE)
- Internal read and write activity from different bus masters (CPUs, EDMA TPTCs + MMU, ...)
- OCMC memory
- Transfer of data via the DDR interface
- Interprocessor communication (Mailbox, Spinlock)
- SPI communication to microcontroller
- Watchdog timer
- DCAN interface
- I2C interface
- Internal timers for operating system
- GMAC
- Display subsystem (DSS)
- IVA subsystem
- GPU
- UART

Figure 8 shows the device block diagram with the safety functions for the Ethernet surround view system mapped to it. The red rectangles denote the blocks on which safety functions need to be mapped.





Figure 8. Block Diagram of Safety Functions for Ethernet Surround View System

#### 4.2.4 Operating States

The VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device products have a common architectural definition of operating states. These operating states should be observed by the system developer in their software and system level design concepts. The operating states state machine is shown in Figure 9 and described below.



**Figure 9. Operating States**

- **Powered Off** - This is the initial operating state of the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device. No power is applied to the different power supply rails and the device is non-functional. This state can only transition to the safe state, and can only be reached from the safe state.
- **Safe** - In the safe state, the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device is powered but non-operational. The nPOR (power-on reset, also known as cold reset) is asserted by the system but is not released until power supplies have ramped to a stable state. When the product is in the safe state, the CPU and peripherals are nonfunctional. The *Terminal Description* section in the *TDA2x ADAS Applications Processor 23mm Package (ABC Package) Data Manual* (SPRS859) provides details about the pin behavior during reset.
- **Cold Boot** - In the cold boot state, key analog elements, digital control logic, and debug logic are initialized for future use. The CPU remains powered but non-operational. When the cold boot process is completed, the nRESET signal is internally released, leading to the warm boot stage. The nRESET signal transition change can be monitored externally on the nRSTOUT output pin.
- **Warm Boot** - The warm boot mode resets digital logic and enables the Cortex-A15. The Cortex-A15 begins executing software from the internal boot ROM and software initialization of the device begins. There is no hardware interlock to say that warm boot is completed; this is a software decision.
- **Operational** - During the operational mode, the device is capable of supporting safety critical functionality.

#### 4.2.5 Management of Errors

The error response is an action that is taken by the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device or system when an error is indicated. There are multiple potential error responses possible for the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid product family. The system integrator is responsible to determine what error response should be taken and to ensure that this is consistent with the system safety concept.

- CPU abort - This response is implemented directly in the CPU, for diagnostics implemented in the CPU. During an abort, the program sequence transfers context to an abort handler and software has an opportunity to manage the fault.
- CPU interrupts - This response can be implemented for diagnostics outside of the CPU. An interrupt allows events external to the CPU to generate a program sequence context transfer to an interrupt handler where software has an opportunity to manage the fault.
- Generation of warm reset - This response allows the device to change states to warm boot from operational state. The warm reset could be generated from an external monitor on nRESET or internally by the software global warm reset, emulation warm reset, or watchdog. Re-entry to the warm reset state allows possibility for software recovery when recovery in the operational state was not possible.
- Generation of cold reset - This response allows the device to change state to safe state from cold boot, warm boot, or operational states. From this state, it is possible to re-enter cold boot to attempt recovery when recovery via warm boot is not possible. It is also possible to move to the powered-down state, if desired, to implement a system level safe state. This response can be generated by the software global cold reset or nPOR pin, but is primarily driven by monitors external to the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device.

#### 4.3 Safety Mechanisms and Assumptions of Use

You, as a system and equipment manufacturer or designer, are responsible to ensure that your systems (and any TI hardware or software components incorporated in your systems) meet all applicable safety, regulatory and system-level performance requirements. All application and safety related information in this document (including application descriptions, suggested safety measures, suggested TI products, and other materials) is provided for reference only. You understand and agree that your use of TI components in safety critical applications is entirely at your risk, and that you (as buyer) agree to defend, indemnify, and hold TI harmless from any and all damages, claims, suits, or expense resulting from such use.

In this section, the safety mechanisms for each major functional block of the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device architecture are summarized and general assumptions of use are provided. This information should be used to determine the strategy for utilizing safety mechanisms. The details of each safety mechanism can be found in the device-specific technical reference manual for the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device used.

There are many diverse ways to implement safe systems and alternate safety mechanisms may be possible that can provide support to achieve desired safety metrics. The categories of recommendation are as follows:

- Mandatory - A mandatory notation indicates a safety mechanism that is always operable during normal functional operation and cannot be disabled by user action.
- Highly Recommended - A highly recommended notation indicates a safety mechanism that TI believes to provide a high value of diagnostics that are difficult to implement by other means. The user retains the choice whether or not to utilize the safety mechanism in their design, as user action is either needed to enable the safety mechanism or user action can disable the safety mechanism.
- Recommended - A recommended notation indicates a safety mechanism that TI believes to provide a valuable diagnostic that can also be implemented by other means. The user retains the choice whether or not to utilize the safety mechanism in their design, as user action is either needed to enable the safety mechanism or user action can disable the safety mechanism.
- Optional - An optional notation indicates a safety mechanism that TI believe to provide a lower value diagnostic that can also be implemented by other means. The user retains the choice whether or not to utilize the safety mechanism in their design, as user action is either needed to enable the safety mechanism or user action can disable the safety mechanism.

Depending on the safety standard and end equipment targeted, it may be necessary to manage not only single point faults, but also latent faults. Per ISO 26262:2011, the latent faults to be considered are when the faults in a function are both present: the capability to violate a safety goal and to cause a fault in the safety mechanism. Latent fault testing does not need to occur during the fault tolerant time interval, but can be performed at boot time, at shut down, or periodically as determined by the system developer. Many of the safety mechanisms described in this section can be used as primary diagnostics, diagnostics for latent fault, or both. When considering system design for management of latent faults, take care to include failure of CPU and memories in consideration for any primary diagnostic that is executed via software.

#### 4.3.1 Power Supply

The VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device family products require an external device to supply the necessary voltages and currents for proper operation. Separate voltage rails are available for core logic, I/O, phase-locked loop (PLL) and other functions.

##### 4.3.1.1 External Voltage Supervisor

It is highly recommended to use an external voltage supervisor to monitor all voltage rails. The voltage supervisor should be configured with overvoltage and undervoltage thresholds matching the voltage ranges supported by the target device (as noted in the device-specific data sheet). Error response, diagnostic testability and any necessary software requirements are defined by the external voltage supervisor selected by the system integrator.

##### 4.3.1.2 Power Sequencing

In order for the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device to function properly, it is highly recommended to implement the power sequencing requirements as outlined in the *Power Sequence* section of the *TDA2x ADAS Applications Processor 23mm Package (ABC Package) Data Manual* (SPRS859).

##### 4.3.1.3 Notes

- VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid management of voltage supervision at system level can be simplified by using a TI system basis chip, developed for use with the family.
- Devices can be implemented with multiple power rails that are intended to be ganged together on the system PCB. For proper operation of power diagnostics, it is recommended to implement one voltage supervisor per ganged rail.
- Common mode failure analysis of the external voltage supervisor may be useful to determine dependencies in the voltage generation and supervision circuitry.

#### 4.3.2 Power Management

The power, reset and clock module (PRCM) is responsible for control of switchable power domains. Dependent on the family variant used, one or more power domains can be implemented. Power domains can be permanently configured at manufacturing time by TI or they can be user programmable. To determine the power domains supported on your device, see the device-specific data sheet. For programming information, see the device-specific technical reference manual.

#### 4.3.3 Clocks

The VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device family products are primarily synchronous logic devices and as such require clock signals for proper operation. The clock management logic includes clock sources, clock generation logic including clock multiplication by PLLs, clock dividers, and clock distribution logic. The registers that are used to program the clock management logic are located in the PRCM. The customer software or hardware should ensure monitoring of the relevant temperature, lock, clock quality and any other signal relevant to ensure the right clock (as required in the device-specific data sheet) through the mechanisms listed in the device-specific technical reference manual.

#### **4.3.3.1 Monitoring of External Clock Outputs**

The VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device family products provide the capability to export select internal clocking signals for external monitoring. This feature can be configured by programming registers in the PRCM module. To determine the number of external clock outputs implemented and the register mapping of internal clocks that can be exported, see the device-specific data sheet. Export of internal clocks on the dedicated outputs is not enabled by default and must be enabled via software. It is possible to disable and configure this diagnostic via software. Use of the CLKOUT feature for external monitoring of internal clocks is optional.

#### **4.3.3.2 Internal Watchdog**

The VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device family products support the use of an internal watchdog. For details of programming the internal watchdog, see the device-specific technical reference manual. The watchdog is a traditional single threshold watchdog. The user programs a reload value to the watchdog and must provide a predetermined “pet” response to the watchdog before the timeout counter overflows. Overflow of the timeout counter triggers an error response. The watchdog can issue either an internal (warm) system reset or a CPU interrupt upon detection of a failure. When the watchdog generates a reset, the RSTOUTn pin is driven low. The watchdog is not enabled after reset. Once enabled by the software, the watchdog can be disabled and enabled by writing the proper disable and enable sequence. Use of the watchdog functionality is optional.

#### **4.3.3.3 External Watchdog**

When using an external watchdog, there is a possibility to reduce common mode failure with the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid clocking system, as the watchdog can utilize clock, reset, and power that are separate from the system being monitored. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the external watchdog selected by the system integrator. The VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid platform highly recommends the use of an external watchdog over the internally provided watchdog.

#### **4.3.3.4 Software Read Back of Written Configuration**

In order to ensure proper configuration of memory-mapped clock control registers, it is highly recommended that software implement a test to confirm proper operation of all control register writes. To support this software test, it is highly recommended to configure the clock module memory space as a strongly ordered, non-bufferable memory region using the memory management units (MMU). This ensures that the register write has completed before the read back is initiated.

#### **4.3.3.5 Periodic Read Back of Configuration Registers**

Periodic read back of configuration registers can provide a diagnostic for inadvertent writes or disturb of these registers. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of read back of configuration registers mechanism is recommended.

#### **4.3.3.6 Notes**

- There are many possible implementations of watchdogs for use in providing clock and CPU diagnostics. In general, TI recommends the use of an external watchdog over an internal watchdog for reasons of reduced common mode failure. TI also recommends the use of a program sequence, windowed, or question and answer watchdog as opposed to a single threshold watchdog due to the additional failure modes that can be detected by a more advanced watchdog.
- Driving a high-frequency clock output on the CLKOUT pins may have EMI implications.



#### 4.3.4 Reset

The VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device family products require an external reset at cold and power-on (porz) to place all asynchronous and synchronous logic into a known state. The power-on reset generates an internal warm reset signal to reset the majority of digital logic as part of the boot process. Optionally, the resetn pin can be driven to generate an internal warm reset. The rstoutn signal is provided at device level as in I/O pin. The rstoutn pin asserts low in response to any global reset condition on the device. For more information on the reset functionality, see the device-specific data sheet and the device-specific technical reference manual.

##### 4.3.4.1 Software Cold/Warm Reset Generation

The system module provides the ability to the software to generate an internal cold or warm reset. This is accomplished by writing appropriate control bits in the PRCM Reset Control Register (PRM\_RSTCTRL). Software can utilize this feature to attempt failure recovery. Use of the software cold or warm reset is optional.

##### 4.3.4.2 External Watchdog

An external watchdog can provide secondary diagnostic. For more information on this diagnostics, see [Section 4.3.3.3](#).

##### 4.3.4.3 External Monitoring of Warm Reset (RSTOUTn)

The RSTOUTn warm reset signal is implemented as an output. An external monitor can be utilized to detect expected or unexpected changes to the state of the internal warm reset control signal. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the external monitor selected by the system integrator. Use of this feature is considered optional.

##### 4.3.4.4 Software Check of Cause of Last Reset

The PRCM provides a status register (PRM\_RSTST) that latches the cause of the most recent reset event. Boot software that checks the status of this register to determine the last reset event is typically implemented by software developers. This information can be used by the software to manage failure recovery. Software use of the PRM\_RSTST to check last reset cause of highly recommended.

##### 4.3.4.5 Notes

Internal watchdogs are not a viable option for reset diagnostics as the monitored reset signals interact with the internal watchdogs.

#### 4.3.5 PRCM and Control Module

The PRCM and control modules provide general system configuration control. In order to provide protection for unintended change of control module registers, certain address regions in the control module register address space can be locked. For more information, see the control module description in the device-specific technical reference manual.

##### 4.3.5.1 Software Read Back of Written Configuration

In order to ensure proper configuration of memory-mapped control registers, it is highly recommended that software implement a test to confirm proper operation of all control register writes. To support this software test, it is highly recommended to configure the PRCM and control module memory space as a strongly ordered, non-bufferable memory region using the memory management units (MMU). This ensures that the register write has completed before the read back is initiated.

### **4.3.5.2 Periodic Read Back of Configuration Registers**

Periodic read back of configuration registers can provide a diagnostic for inadvertent writes or disturb of these registers. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of read back of configuration registers mechanism is recommended.

### **4.3.5.3 Notes**

Depending upon the targeted metrics, a user can elect to implement a periodic software test of static configuration registers in the PRCM and control module. Such a test can provide additional diagnostic coverage for disruption by soft error.

## **4.3.6 CPU Subsystems**

### **4.3.6.1 Dual Cortex-A15 MPU Subsystem**

The dual Cortex-A15 MPU subsystem provides few diagnostic capabilities to detect anomalies in the program execution or handling of data.

#### **4.3.6.1.1 CPU Diagnostic**

The dual Cortex-A15 MPU subsystem implements two Cortex-A15 cores. In order to detect faults in the CPU internal blocks (ALU, register bank, floating-point unit, and so forth), it is highly recommended to implement appropriate software strategies. Redundant calculation on two different CPU subsystems or software diversified redundant calculation on the Cortex-A15 subsystem of safety critical portions of the application could be implemented by the system.

#### **4.3.6.1.2 CPU Memory Management Unit (MMU)**

The dual Cortex-A15 MPU subsystem includes an MMU. The MMU logic can be used to provide spatial separation of software tasks in the device memory. It is expected that the operating system controls the MMU and changes the MMU settings based on the needs of each task. A violation of a configured memory protection policy results in a CPU abort. Use of the MMU is highly recommended. Software-based testing of the MMU for proper operation and error response is optional.

#### **4.3.6.1.3 L1 and L2 Memory System**

The Dual Cortex-A15 MPU subsystem implements a separate L1 instruction and data cache for the two A15 cores and a unified L2 cache for instruction and data. The caches are not protected by any dedicated diagnostic hardware mechanisms to detect faults. Appropriate software mechanisms can be implemented to overcome this limitation:

- If caches are utilized, then redundant copies of the algorithm should run. It is suggested to flush the cache if these two redundant copies of the algorithm are running out of the same memory regions sequentially.
- If the two redundant copies of the same algorithm are not run sequentially, then they should run out of their own memory regions, which are copies of each other. In that scenario the data will be fetched twice by the memory cache subsystem (from the main memory) and, therefore, the cache errors will be diagnosed.
- For both of the above scenarios, a checker program is required after the redundant copies complete their execution.
- Marking regions of code or data that are safety critical as non-cacheable in the MMU.



#### 4.3.6.1.4 Online Profiling Using Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU)

The dual Cortex-A15 MPU subsystem includes a performance monitoring unit (PMU). This logic is intended to be used for debug and code profiling purposes, but it can also be utilized as a safety mechanism. The PMU includes a CPU cycle counter as well as six additional counters, which can be programmed to count a number of different CPU events. For a complete list of CPU events that can be monitored, see the *Dual Cortex-A15 MPU Technical Reference Manual* located at

<http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.subset.cortexa.cortexa15/index.html>.

Examples of the CPU events that can be monitored include:

- Number of instructions executed
- Number of cycles in which an exception is taken

With such information available, it is possible to generate a software routine that periodically checks the PMU counter values and compares these values to the profile expected during normal operation. The PMU is not enabled by default and must be configured via software. Use of the PMU for online diagnostic profiling is optional.

#### 4.3.6.1.5 Internal or External Watchdog

The MPU watchdog timer (MPU\_WD\_TIMER) implements two channels: one per MPU core. Each MPU\_WD\_TIMER implements a 32-bit decrementing counter, which has a period set by the value loaded into the counter, two interrupt output signals (WARN, INTR) and one reset request output. Also, the users can set up a warning condition which can be used to signal an interrupt that gives software a notice when the timer is close to a timeout. Use of the watchdog functionality is optional.

When using an external watchdog, there is a possibility to reduce common mode failure with the MCU clocking system, as the watchdog can utilize clock, reset, and power that are separate from the system being monitored. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the external watchdog selected by the system integrator.

#### 4.3.6.1.6 Software Read Back of Written Configuration

In order to ensure the proper configuration of the CPU coprocessor control registers, it is highly recommended that software implement a periodic test to confirm proper operation of all control register writes. The CPU control registers are not memory mapped and must be accessed via the CPU coprocessor read and write commands.

#### 4.3.6.1.7 Periodic Read Back of Configuration Registers

Periodic read back of configuration registers can provide a diagnostic for inadvertent writes or disturb of these registers. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of read back of configuration registers mechanism is recommended.

### 4.3.6.2 C66x DSP Subsystem

#### 4.3.6.2.1 CPU Diagnostic

The C66x DSP subsystem implements a single C66x DSP instantiation. In order to detect faults in the CPU internal blocks (ALU, register bank, floating-point unit, and so forth), it is highly recommended to implement appropriate software strategies. Redundant calculation on two different CPU subsystems or software diversified redundant calculation on the C66x DSP subsystem of safety critical portions of the application could be implemented by the system.

#### 4.3.6.2.2 **Illegal Operation and Instruction Trapping**

The C66x DSP includes diagnostics for illegal operations and instructions that can serve as safety mechanisms. Many of these traps are not enabled after reset and must be configured by the software. Installation of software handlers to support the hardware illegal operation and instruction trapping is highly recommended. Examples of CPU illegal operation and instruction traps include:

- Illegal instruction
- Illegal behavior within an instruction
- Resource conflicts

#### 4.3.6.2.3 **L1 and L2 Memory System**

The C66x DSP subsystem implements a separate L1 instruction (L1P) and data cache (L1D) and a unified L2 cache for instruction and data. The L1P cache is protected by 1 parity bit for 256 data bits. The L1D cache is not protected by any dedicated diagnostic hardware mechanisms to detect faults. The L2 cache implements 10 parity bits per 256 data bits for Single Error Correction Double Error Detection (SECDED). CPU accesses, but also certain accesses of other masters (DMA and IDMA) to the SRAM and Cache can utilize these diagnostic measures. It is highly recommended to enable the parity and SECDED feature for the application.

#### 4.3.6.2.4 **Memory Protection Architecture**

The C66x megamodule memory protection architecture provides these benefits through a combination of CPU privilege levels and a memory system permission structure.

Code running on the CPU executes in one of two privilege modes: supervisor mode or user mode. Supervisor code is considered more trusted than user code. Examples of supervisor threads include operating system kernels and hardware device drivers. Examples of user threads include vocoders and end applications.

Supervisor mode is generally granted access to peripheral registers and the memory protection configuration. User mode is generally confined to the memory spaces that the OS specifically designates for its use.

CPU accesses as well as internal DMA and other accesses have a privilege level associated with them. The internal DMA accesses that are initiated by the CPU inherit the CPU's privilege level at the time they are initiated.

The C66x memory protection architecture divides the DSP internal memory (L1P, L1D, L2) into pages. Each page has an associated set of permissions which can be set differently for each requestor ID. For more detailed information, see the device-specific TRM.

It is highly recommended to use the features of the memory protection architecture in the application.

#### 4.3.6.2.5 **CPU Memory Management Unit (MMU)**

The C66x DSP subsystem includes two Memory Management Units (MMUs), on EDMA L2 interconnect and DSP MDMA paths, for accessing the device L3\_MAIN interconnect address space. The MMUs enable mapping of only the necessary application space to the processor.

Both DSP MMUs generate interrupts which are internally mapped to the DSP interrupt controller and output to the device IRQ crossbar. Both DSP MMUs (on MDMA and EDMA paths) have identical functionalities.

- 32-bit input and output address width (to match L3\_MAIN address width)
- 32 TLB cache entries
- 32 + 1 tags
- 128-bit data bus for MDMA and EDMA ports

For more detailed information, see the device specific technical reference manual.

It is highly recommended to use the features of the MMUs in the application.

#### 4.3.6.2.6 **Internal or External Watchdog**

An internal or external watchdog can provide secondary diagnostic. For more information on these diagnostics, see [Section 4.3.3.2](#) or [Section 4.3.3.3](#).

#### 4.3.6.2.7 **Software Read Back of Written Configuration**

In order to ensure proper configuration of the CPU coprocessor control registers, it is highly recommended that software implement a periodic test to confirm proper operation of all control register writes. The CPU control registers are memory mapped.

#### 4.3.6.2.8 **Periodic Read Back of Configuration Registers**

Periodic read back of configuration registers can provide a diagnostic for inadvertent writes or disturb of these registers. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of read back of configuration registers mechanism is recommended.

### 4.3.6.3 **Cortex-M4 IPU Subsystem**

The Cortex-M4 IPU subsystem consists of two independent Cortex-M4 CPUs working off a unified cache for instruction and data that serves both CPUs.

#### 4.3.6.3.1 **CPU Diagnostics**

The Cortex-M4 IPU subsystem implements two Cortex-M4 instantiations. Both CPUs are working independently from each other. In order to detect faults in the CPU internal blocks (ALU, register bank, floating-point unit, and so forth), it is highly recommended to implement appropriate software strategies. Redundant calculation on two different CPU subsystems or software diversified redundant calculation on the Cortex-M4 subsystem of safety critical portions of the application could be implemented by the system.

#### 4.3.6.3.2 **Illegal Operation and Instruction Trapping**

The Cortex-M4 CPU includes diagnostics for illegal operations and instructions that can serve as safety mechanisms. Many of these traps are not enabled after reset and must be configured by the software. Installation of software handlers to support the hardware illegal operation and instruction trapping is highly recommended. Examples of CPU illegal operation and instruction traps include:

- An undefined instruction
- An illegal unaligned access
- Invalid state on instruction execution
- Errors on exception return
- Unaligned addresses on word and halfword memory accesses
- Division by zero

#### 4.3.6.3.3 **Unified Cache and Memory Management Unit**

The Cortex-M4 IPU subsystem implements a unified cache for instruction and data. The cache is not protected by any dedicated diagnostic hardware mechanisms to detect faults. Appropriate software mechanisms can be implemented to overcome this limitation:

- Flushing the cache in between execution of redundant programs is highly recommended.
- Storing of data twice in main memory will also lead to duplicates in the data cache. A comparison of the redundant data before its use can detect faults in the cache.
- Marking regions of code or data that are safety critical as non-cacheable in the MMU

The unified cache includes an MMU. The MMU logic can be used to provide spatial separation of software tasks in the device memory. It is expected that the operating system controls the MMU and changes the settings based on the needs of each task. A violation of a configured memory protection policy results in a CPU abort. Use of the MMU is highly recommended.

Software-based testing of the MMU for proper operation and error response is optional.

#### 4.3.6.3.4 Online Profiling Using Data Watchpoint and Trace Unit (DWT)

The Cortex-M4 CPU includes a performance monitoring unit called Data Watchpoint and Trace (DWT). This logic is intended to be used for debug and code profiling purposes, but it can also be utilized as a safety mechanism. The DWT includes a CPU cycle counter as well as five additional counters, which can be programmed to count a number of different CPU events. For a complete list of CPU events that can be monitored, see the *Cortex-M4 Technical Reference Manual* located at <http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.subset.cortexm.m4/index.html#cortexm4>. Examples of the CPU events that can be monitored include:

- Folded instructions
- Load store unit (LSU) operations
- Sleep cycles
- CPI (all instruction cycles except for the first cycle)
- Interrupt overhead

With such information available, it is possible to generate a software routine that periodically checks the DWT counter values and compares these values to the profile expected during normal operation. The DWT is not enabled by default and must be configured via software. Use of the DWT for online diagnostic profiling is optional.

#### 4.3.6.3.5 Internal or External Watchdog

An internal or external watchdog can provide secondary diagnostic. For more information on these diagnostics, see [Section 4.3.3.2](#) or [Section 4.3.3.3](#).

#### 4.3.6.3.6 Software Read Back of Written Configuration

In order to ensure proper configuration of the CPU coprocessor control registers, it is highly recommended that software implement a test to confirm proper operation of all control register writes. The CPU control registers are memory mapped.

#### 4.3.6.3.7 Periodic Read Back of Configuration Registers

Periodic read back of configuration registers can provide a diagnostic for inadvertent writes or disturb of these registers. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of read back of configuration registers mechanism is recommended.

### 4.3.6.4 EVE Subsystem

#### 4.3.6.4.1 Diagnostic Measures

The EVE subsystem implements a single EVE instantiation. In order to detect faults in the EVE internal blocks (ARP32, VCOP, EDMA and so forth), it is highly recommended to implement appropriate software strategies. Redundant calculation on two different subsystems or software diversified redundant calculation on the EVE subsystem of safety critical portions of the application could be implemented by the system.

#### 4.3.6.4.2 Illegal Operation and Invalid Instruction Detection

The EVE subsystem includes diagnostics for invalid instruction detection on ARP32 and VCOP and illegal address detection on the EVE interconnect operations that can serve as safety mechanisms. Many of these features may not be enabled after reset and must be configured by the software. Installation of software handlers to support the hardware illegal operation and instruction trapping is highly recommended.

#### 4.3.6.4.3 Internal Memory System

The EVE subsystem implements the following memories:

- P\$/PMEM : ARP32 program cache
- DMEM: ARP32 data memory
- WBUF: VCOP working buffer
- IBUFLA: Image buffer low copy A
- IBUFLB: Image buffer low copy B
- IBUFHA: Image buffer high copy A
- IBUFHB: Image buffer high copy B

The EVE subsystem supports parity based error detection on all of the above memories on the minimum access size granularity of 8 bits (there is 1b of parity per byte of memory). The EVE subsystem supports:

- Single error detect (parity bit per byte) on DMEM, WBUF, IBUF\*
- Double bit error detect on program cache
  - Distance 3 hamming code – detection only, no correction
  - 10 bits per 256b cache line. The 10b hamming code is also applied to the tag and the address for a particular cache line

It is highly recommended to enable the parity feature for the application.

#### 4.3.6.4.4 Memory Management Unit (MMU)

The EVE subsystem includes two MMUs: each of the two EDMA TCs is mapped to one of the two MMUs. One of the MMUs is also shared with ARP32 program and data accesses. For the EDMA paths, the two MMUs provide maximum concurrency for each TC and its respective accesses to system memory. MMU allows multiple EVEs to have the same software even when the EVEs are communicating with each other. This can be accomplished by using virtual addresses for each EVE address space. For detailed information, see the device specific technical reference manual.

Use of the MMUs is highly recommended.

#### 4.3.6.4.5 Internal or External Watchdog

An internal or external watchdog can provide secondary diagnostic. For more information on these diagnostics, see [Section 4.3.3.2](#) or [Section 4.3.3.3](#).

#### 4.3.6.4.6 Locking Mechanism for Control Registers

The EVE subsystem provides a lock and unlock mechanism that helps to prevent unintended access to the various control registers of the EVE control module, or EVE sub-components. A total of 10 lock and unlock registers are defined, where each register is used to lock and unlock access to a specific area of the memory map. For more details, see the device-specific technical reference manual. It is highly recommended to use the lock and unlock mechanism.

#### 4.3.6.4.7 Hardware Assisted Software Self Test - MISRs

In order to facilitate software self-test, MISRs are instantiated on address and data buses at key points in the system, such as ARP32 interfaces and the Interconnect/WBUF interface. ARP32 is covered since it is the key control engine. WBUF coverage is provided as a convenient central destination that can be used as to indirectly provide coverage for a majority of EVE logic.

The MISRs monitor the address and data busses, and calculates a signature based on the data and address pattern on valid address or data phases. The signature registers reset to a value of 0x0. A different seed value can be manually written via software to each of the signature registers. Based on a known memory access data pattern, the MISR signature can be predicted or calculated (or recorded on a known good system) and used as a reference for subsequent tests that can take place at boot time or during run-time in a safety critical application.

The MISR calculation is a shift-register/XOR tree calculation using classical CRC algorithms.

It is recommended to use hardware assisted software self test feature.

#### **4.3.6.4.8 Error Recovery - ARP32 and OCP Disconnect**

To prevent runaway code from corrupting the remainder of the system, and provide a clean reset/recovery mechanism, the EVE subsystem provides a mechanism to disconnect ARP32 from the remainder of EVE subsystem, and to disconnect L3 initiator buses from the remainder of the device.

When ARP32 or OCP initiator buses are disconnected, the MPU or debugger can see the EVE MMRs and memories through the interconnect target bus.

When the ARP32 and OCP buses are disconnected, a full reset and reboot cycle are issued in order to resume normal ARP32<->EVE operation. This is required in order to avoid any asynchronous timing paths due to asynchronous reset assertion to ARP32.

Software must wait for disconnected state before issuing a reset to the ARP32 core. This assures that the neighboring system is not in a corrupted state. It is highly recommended to enable this error recovery feature in the application.

#### **4.3.6.4.9 Software Read Back of Written Configuration**

In order to ensure proper configuration of the EVE subsystem control registers, it is highly recommended that software implement a test to confirm proper operation of all control register writes. The EVE control registers are memory mapped.

#### **4.3.6.4.10 Periodic Read Back of Configuration Registers**

Periodic read back of configuration registers can provide a diagnostic for inadvertent writes or disturb of these registers. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of read back of configuration registers mechanism is recommended.

### **4.3.7 Network-on-Chip (NoC) L3 Interconnect Subsystem**

The level 3 (L3) interconnect is an instantiation of the NoC interconnect from Arteris®.

#### **4.3.7.1 Diagnostic Measures**

It is highly recommended to implement appropriate software strategies to perform a periodic dataflow-independent cyclical test of data paths. Defined test patterns to compare observations with corresponding expected values could be implemented by the system.

#### **4.3.7.2 Timeout Monitoring**

The Network-on-Chip (NoC) interconnect incorporates a generic target timeout feature. The interconnect generates a timeout event when transactions take too long to execute, either because a request exceeded a time threshold before being accepted by the target, or because a response exceeded a time threshold to be issued by the target since the corresponding request. Interconnect monitoring using timeout is highly recommended.

#### **4.3.7.3 Statistics Collectors**

The NoC interconnect includes a performance monitoring unit that includes statistics collectors. This programmable unit is intended for performance monitoring capability by probing interconnect links, recording events and transmitting results to a debug unit but it can also be used as a safety mechanism.

It is possible to collect statistics for any of the initiators in the system.



#### **4.3.7.4 Quality of Service (QoS) Units**

The NoC interconnect includes several QoS units like bandwidth regulators and bandwidth limiters for several key initiators in the system. These units are intended to make it possible to assure an average target bandwidth to an initiator or to prevent initiators from consuming too much bandwidth of a link, or a target, that is shared between dataflows but they can also be used as safety mechanisms.

#### **4.3.7.5 Error Handling**

Error logging is enabled for the NoC interconnect.

The three major types of errors reported are:

- Slave Network Interface Unit (NIU) errors
- Firewall errors
- Flag Mux errors

It is highly recommended that the software performs necessary actions on receiving a NoC reported error.

#### **4.3.7.6 Software Read Back of Written Configuration**

In order to ensure proper configuration of the NoC registers, it is highly recommended that software implement a test to confirm proper operation of all register writes. The NoC registers are memory mapped.

#### **4.3.7.7 Periodic Read Back of Configuration Registers**

Periodic read back of configuration registers can provide a diagnostic for inadvertent writes or disturb of these registers. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of read back of configuration registers mechanism is recommended.

### **4.3.8 On Chip RAM (OCMC) Subsystem**

The on-chip RAM (OCMC) is memory that can be used by multiple masters for data storage. The on-chip RAM is supported by single error correction, dual error detection (SECDED) error correcting code (ECC) diagnostic.

Three OCM controllers (OCMC) are associated with the on-chip RAM. The RAM associated controllers are as follows:

- OCMC\_RAM1 with 512 KB of dedicated memory space
- OCMC\_RAM2 with 1024 KB of dedicated memory space
- OCMC\_RAM3 with 1024 KB of dedicated memory space

#### **4.3.8.1 ECC**

The on-chip RAM is supported by single error correction, dual error detection (SECDED) error correcting code (ECC) diagnostic. When enabled, the ECC generated is Hamming(155,146) code and has a Hamming distance of 4. The OCM controller supports four modes of operation:

- Non-ECC mode (data access)
- Non-ECC mode (code access)
- Full-ECC mode
- Block-ECC mode

The default mode of operation for the OCM controller is the non-ECC data access mode. For detailed information, see the device-specific technical reference manual.

It is highly recommended to enable the ECC feature while using the OCMC RAMs. This diagnostic feature can be tested through the software sequences outlined in the *OCMC* section in the device-specific technical reference manual.

#### **4.3.8.2 Circular Buffer (CBUF) Mode Error Handling**

The OCM controller provides up to 12 programmable circular buffers that are mapped to virtual video frames to support slide based on-the-fly video frame processing. For each write or read access associated with the virtual frame buffer, the OCM controller performs various address error checks to prevent illegal CBUF accesses from causing false overflow and underflow conditions.

The CBUF provides support for the following:

- Detection of VBUF address not mapped to a CBUF memory space
- Detection of VBUF access not starting at the base address
- Illegal address change between two same type accesses
- Detection of illegal frame size (short frame detection)
- Detection of CBUF overflow
- Detection of CBUF underflow

For detailed information regarding all CBUF events, see the device-specific technical reference manual. Use of this feature is recommended.

#### **4.3.8.3 Correctable ECC Profiling**

The OCM RAMs include a capability to count the number of correctable ECC errors detected. This counter is 16-bit wide and keeps track of all SEC error events. When the error count exceeds a user programmed threshold, an exception (SEC error found) is asserted by the OCM RAM controller.

There are three counters that are used to count different types of errors occurred when the ECC mode is enabled. The counters are the following:

- SEC counter – for the single errors occurred
- DED counter – for double error detections
- ADDRERR counter – for address errors found when a single error occurs

For detailed information, see the device-specific technical reference manual. Use of this feature is recommended.

#### **4.3.9 General-Purpose Timer (GP) Subsystem**

The GP timer can be used for operating system scheduling and other timer functionality. The logic block does not implement diagnostic features to ensure the correctness of the timer and the corresponding interrupt generation. For consistency checks, a second timer can be used. This could be implemented by reading the primary and secondary counter values and comparing them. Another possibility to do some consistency checks would be to generate two independent interrupts and checking the plausibility of both. This scheme would ensure a case where the primary interrupt might not be generated or recognized by the system. Care needs to be taken to account for possible jitter due to program execution differences (cache vs non-cached accesses) or other exceptions that may interrupt reading the primary and secondary counter values.

##### **4.3.9.1 Periodic Read Back of Configuration Registers**

Periodic read back of configuration registers can provide a diagnostic for inadvertent writes or disturb of these registers. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of read back of configuration registers mechanism is recommended.

#### **4.3.10 Interprocessor Communication (IPC)**

The IPC is used to communicate between the different CPUs in this heterogeneous architecture. It consists of Mailboxes and Spinlocks.



#### 4.3.10.1 Mailboxes

The queued mailbox-interrupt mechanism allows the software to establish a communication channel between two processors through a set of registers and associated interrupt signals by sending and receiving messages (mailboxes). There are three mailbox module instances in the device:

- System mailbox (13 instances) - used for communications across various CPU cores on the device.
- IVA mailbox (1 instance) - used for communication between one internal to the IVA subsystem user (imaging controller 1 - iCont1, or imaging controller 2 - iCont2) and three external (selected among MPU, DSP1, DSP2, IPU1 and PRUSS1) to the IVA subsystem users. This communication is insured through three pairs of mailboxes. The IVA subsystem is an enclosed block, the user only has limited access, therefore, testing the IVA mailbox for potential failures may be limited.
- EVE mailbox (5 mailboxes per EVE instance) – used for communication between a) EVE local user (ARP32) and three external users (selected among MPU, DSP1, DSP2, IPU1 and PRUSS1) – Mailbox 0 and 1 are dedicated for this communication and b) communication across the various EVE instances on the device – Mailbox2, 3 and 4 are dedicated for this communication.

Test patterns can be developed by the user to test the functionality of the mailboxes at startup or shutdown to ensure the functionality of the mailbox. During application runtime, plausibility checks can be made when receiving interrupts from the mailbox on the timing of the mailbox interrupt as well as on the data that is passed through the mailbox.

#### 4.3.10.2 Spinlocks

The Spinlock module provides hardware assistance for synchronizing the processes running on multiple processors in the device. It provides hardware semaphores to lock or unlock access to data structures in the application.

To ensure the functionality of the spinlock module, test patterns can be developed by the user to set the locks to a taken or not-taken state and afterwards checking the state via another CPU read. These test patterns, which cover permanent faults, can either be run at system startup or shutdown. A timeout mechanism could be implemented in software to test for transient errors. A transient error could set the lock to a taken state. As no task has taken claim of the semaphore, the lock will be permanently set to “taken”. Other tasks will not be able to claim the semaphore, but could implement a timeout mechanism for the application to handle the situation appropriately. Another way to diagnose transient faults would be to assign two spinlocks to each data structure. [Table 1](#) shows the descriptions of the possible states and the error conditions.

**Table 1. Spinlock States**

State Returned by First Lock Read	State Returned by Second Lock Read	Comment
0	0	→ No error, data structure safe to use
0	1	Error, either a transient error has cleared the first lock or software has not cleared the second lock. Timeout may be implemented to check the second lock multiple times to make sure the owning process has taken more time to clear it.
1	0	Error, either a transient error has cleared the second lock or software has not cleared the first lock. Timeout may be implemented to check the first lock multiple times to make sure the owning process has taken more time to clear it.
1	1	→ No error, data structure safe to use

#### 4.3.11 Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)

The SPI modules provide serial I/O compliant to the SPI protocol. SPI communications are typically used for communication to smart sensors and actuators, serial memories, and external logic such as a watchdog device. The SPI modules contain internal SRAM buffers.

#### **4.3.11.1 System Test Mode**

The SPI module supports a system test mode that allows the user to test the internal interrupt connection as well as the external I/O connections. It is highly recommended to implement such a test at application startup or shutdown.

#### **4.3.11.2 Information Redundancy Techniques**

Information redundancy techniques can be applied via software as an additional runtime diagnostic for SPI communication. There are many techniques that can be applied, such as read back of written values and multiple reads of the same target data with comparison of results. Alternatively, redundancy can be achieved by implementation of multiple channels in the system. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of information redundancy techniques in McSPI transactions is highly recommended.

#### **4.3.11.3 Periodic Read Back of Configuration Registers**

Periodic read back of configuration registers can provide a diagnostic for inadvertent writes or disturb of these registers. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of read back of configuration registers mechanism is recommended.

### **4.3.12 Controller Area Network (CAN)**

The DCAN interface provides medium throughput networking with event-based triggering, compliant to the CAN protocol. The DCAN module requires an external transceiver to operate on the CAN network.

#### **4.3.12.1 Software Test of Function Using I/O Loopback**

A software test can be utilized to inject diagnostic errors and check for proper error response. Such a test can be executed at boot or periodically. Software requirements necessary are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of a boot time software test of basic functionality is highly recommended. The use of a periodic software test of basic functionality reporting is optional.

The DCAN implementation supports both digital and analog loopback capabilities for the I/Os. Digital loopback tests the signal path to the module boundary. Analog loopback tests the signal path from the module to the I/O cell with output driver disabled. For best results any tests of the DCAN functionality should include the I/O loopback.

There may be other IO functionalities where the analog PHY is implemented outside the TDA2x device (such as Ethernet and other similar interfaces). If diagnostic coverage is required for the customer use scenarios in all those scenarios, it is strongly recommended to implement a board test scenario using loopback.

#### **4.3.12.2 Information Redundancy Techniques Using End-to-End Safing**

Information redundancy techniques can be applied via software as an additional runtime diagnostic for CAN communication. There are many techniques that can be applied, such as read back of written values and multiple reads of the same target data with comparison of results.

In order to provide diagnostic coverage for network elements outside the device (wiring harness, connectors, transceiver) end-to-end safing mechanisms are applied. These mechanisms can also provide diagnostic coverage inside the device. There are many different schemes applied, such as additional message checksums, redundant transmissions, time diversity in transmissions, and so forth. Most commonly checksums are added to the payload section of a transmission to ensure the correctness of a transmission. These checksums are applied in addition to any protocol level parity and checksums. As the checksum is generated and evaluated by the software at either end of the communication, the whole communication path is safed, resulting in end-to-end safing.

Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the system integrator. Use of this mechanism is highly recommended.

#### **4.3.12.3 DCAN SRAM Parity**

The DCAN SRAM includes a parity diagnostic that can detect single bit errors in the memory. This feature is disabled after reset. Software must configure and enable this feature. Use of the DCAN SRAM parity feature is highly recommended.

#### **4.3.12.4 DCAN SRAM Testing**

The DCAN SRAM contents can be tested periodically using appropriate memory tests (for example, March13N). Use of this diagnostic is highly recommended at application startup or shutdown. As DCAN SRAM contents tend to be more dynamic, use of this diagnostic during normal operation is optional.

#### **4.3.12.5 Periodic Read Back of Configuration Registers**

Periodic read back of configuration registers can provide a diagnostic for inadvertent writes or disturb of these registers. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of read back of configuration registers mechanism is recommended.

#### **4.3.13 DDR2/3 Memory Controller (EMIF)**

The DDR2/3 memory controller is used to interface with JESD79-2E/JESD79-3C standard-compliant DDR2/3 SDRAM devices, respectively. Memory types such as DDR1 SDRAM, SDR SDRAM, SBSRAM, and asynchronous memories are not supported.

##### **4.3.13.1 ECC**

For data integrity, the EMIF1 supports ECC on the data written or read from the SDRAM. The users need to enable the ECC feature by writing to appropriate registers inside the EMIF subsystem. ECC accesses are allowed for both SYS and the MPU ports. 7-bit ECC is calculated over 32-bit data when in 32-bit DDR mode. 6-bit ECC is calculated over 16-bit data when in 16-bit DDR mode. The ECC is calculated for all accesses that are within the address ranges protected by ECC. These address ranges are software configurable. The ECC must be enabled and only aligned writes with byte count in multiple of 8 bytes (ECC quanta) must be used to preload the ECC protected region. The ECC is read and verified during reads. For detailed information, see the device-specific technical reference manual. This diagnostic feature can be tested through the software sequences outlined in the *OCMC* section in the device-specific technical reference manual.

##### **4.3.13.2 Correctable ECC Profiling**

The EMIF1 includes a capability to count the number of correctable ECC errors detected. When the error count exceeds a user programmed threshold, an interrupt is generated by the EMIF controller. The software can use this to gauge the degree of 1-bit ECC errors occurring in the system.

The EMIF also supports a 1-bit ECC data error distribution register that represents whether an error has occurred in a given data channel location. This is advantageous to detect whether errors are random or permanent.

For 2-bit ECC errors in the data, the EMIF generates a 2-bit error interrupt. For any bit errors in the address, the EMIF generates an address error interrupt.

For detailed information, see the device-specific technical reference manual. Use of this feature is recommended.

##### **4.3.13.3 Periodic Read Back of Configuration Registers**

Periodic read back of configuration registers can provide a diagnostic for inadvertent writes or disturb of these registers. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of read back of configuration registers mechanism is recommended.

#### **4.3.13.4 Software Read Back of Written Configuration**

In order to ensure proper configuration of the EMIF registers, it is highly recommended that software implement a test to confirm proper operation of all register writes. The EMIF registers are memory mapped.

#### **4.3.13.5 Use of Performance Counters**

The EMIF controller also support two performance counters to enable to users to monitor or calculate the EMIF controller bandwidth and efficiency. These counters are able to count events such as total SDRAM accesses, SDRAM activates, reads, writes and other events. Each counter counts independent of the other. This programmable unit is intended for performance monitoring capability but it can also be used as a safety mechanism.

For detailed information, see the device-specific technical reference manual. Use of this feature is recommended.

#### **4.3.14 Dynamic Memory Manager (DMM)**

The Dynamic Memory Manager (DMM) is typically located immediately in front of the SDRAM controllers (EMIFs). The DMM manages various aspects of the memory such as:

- Initiator-indexed priority generation
- Multizone SDRAM interleaving configuration
- Multichannel memory transfer optimization

##### **4.3.14.1 Periodic Read Back of Configuration Registers**

Periodic read back of configuration registers can provide a diagnostic for inadvertent writes or disturb of these registers. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of read back of configuration registers mechanism is recommended.

##### **4.3.14.2 Software Read Back of Written Configuration**

In order to ensure proper configuration of the DMM registers, it is highly recommended that software implement a test to confirm proper operation of all register writes. The DMM registers are memory mapped.

#### **4.3.15 Enhanced Direct Memory Access (EDMA)**

The EDMA module is used to move data from one location to another inside the system. This is typically used for peripheral configuration (SRAM to peripheral transfer), peripheral data update (peripheral buffer memory transfer to SRAM for processing) and memory to memory transfers. The DMA is typically used by the operating system to offload bus transactions from the CPU in order to improve overall system performance. The DMA has a local SRAM that is used for channel control information.

##### **4.3.15.1 Memory Protection**

The EDMA3 channel controller supports two kinds of memory protection: active and proxy.

Active memory protection is a feature that allows or prevents read and write accesses (by any EDMA3 programmer) to the EDMA3 Channel Controller Register (EDMA3CC) (based on permission characteristics that you program).

Proxy memory protection allows an EDMA3 transfer programmed by a given EDMA3 programmer to have its permissions travel with the transfer through the EDMA3 Transfer Controller (EDMA3TC). The permissions travel along with the read transactions to the source and the write transactions to the destination endpoints.

The use of the memory protection techniques is highly recommended.

#### **4.3.15.2 Error Detection**

Errors are generated, if enabled, under three conditions:

- EDMA3TC detection of an error signaled by the source or destination address
- Attempt to read or write to an invalid address in the configuration memory map

Detection of a constant addressing mode TR violating the constant addressing mode transfer rules (the source and destination addresses and source and destination indexes must be aligned to 32 bytes).

It is highly recommended to enable these error detection features.

#### **4.3.15.3 Information Redundancy Techniques**

Information redundancy techniques can be applied using the EDMA module. There are many techniques that can be applied, such as read back of written values and multiple reads of the same target data with comparison of results.

Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The implementation of information redundancy techniques on EDMA transactions is recommended.

#### **4.3.15.4 Parameter Memory Testing**

The EDMA3 controller is a RAM-based architecture. The transfer context (source and destination addresses, count, indexes, and so forth) for DMA or QDMA channels is programmed in a parameter RAM table within EDMA3CC, referred to as PaRAM.

The PaRAM contents can be tested periodically using appropriate memory tests (for example, March13N). Use of this diagnostic is highly recommended at application startup or shutdown. As PaRAM contents tend to be static, it is recommended to perform a periodic CRC check of the PaRAM during runtime of the application.

#### **4.3.15.5 Periodic Read Back of Configuration Registers**

Periodic read back of configuration registers can provide a diagnostic for inadvertent writes or disturb of these registers. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of read back of configuration registers mechanism is recommended.

#### **4.3.15.6 Optional Use of Memory Management Unit (MMU1)**

MMU1 on the device is dedicated to EDMA Transfer Controller 0 (TC0) and EDMA Transfer Controller 1 (TC1). Requests initiated by EDMA TC0 and TC1 [both read and write ports] for system MMU1 can optionally be routed through the MMU1. Use of MMU1 by EDMA TC0 and TC1 is independently controllable via the control module.

Usage of MMU1 is highly recommended.

### **4.3.16 Video Input Port (VIP)**

The VIP subsystem does not provide any dedicated hardware diagnostics to detect faults in the module. It is recommended that the user implements dedicated measures on the system level.

#### **4.3.16.1 VIP Overflow Detection and Recovery**

It is possible that an overflow can occur in the VIP\_PARSER. Overflow detection is determined by reading one of the VIP status registers. The status register bits can indicate if not all of the incoming video data was sent to DDR. For detailed information, see the device-specific technical reference manual.

#### **4.3.16.2 Periodic Read Back of Configuration Registers**

Periodic read back of configuration registers can provide a diagnostic for inadvertent writes or disturb of these registers. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of read back of configuration registers mechanism is recommended.

#### **4.3.17 Video Processing Engine (VPE)**

The VPE subsystem does not provide any dedicated hardware diagnostics to detect faults in the module. It is recommended that the user implements dedicated measures on the system level.

##### **4.3.17.1 Periodic Read Back of Configuration Registers**

Periodic read back of configuration registers can provide a diagnostic for inadvertent writes or disturb of these registers. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of read back of configuration registers mechanism is recommended.

#### **4.3.18 Display Subsystem (DSS)**

The DSS subsystem does not provide any dedicated hardware diagnostics to detect faults in the module. It is recommended that the user implements dedicated measures on the system level.

##### **4.3.18.1 Periodic Read Back of Configuration Registers**

Periodic read back of configuration registers can provide a diagnostic for inadvertent writes or disturb of these registers. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of read back of configuration registers mechanism is recommended.

#### **4.3.19 Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C)**

The I2C module provides a multi-master serial bus compliant to the I2C protocol.

##### **4.3.19.1 Software Test of Function**

A software test can be utilized to test basic functionality as well as to inject diagnostic errors and check for proper error response. Such a test can be executed at boot or periodically. Software requirements necessary are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of a boot time software test of basic functionality is highly recommended. The use of a periodic software test of basic functionality reporting is optional.

##### **4.3.19.2 Information Redundancy Techniques**

Information redundancy techniques can be applied via software as an additional runtime diagnostic for I2C communication. There are many techniques that can be applied, such as read back of written values and multiple reads of the same target data with comparison of results. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of information redundancy techniques in I2C transactions is highly recommended.

##### **4.3.19.3 Periodic Read Back of Configuration Registers**

Periodic read back of configuration registers can provide a diagnostic for inadvertent writes or disturb of these registers. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of read back of configuration registers mechanism is recommended.



#### **4.3.19.4 Software Read Back of Written Configuration**

In order to ensure proper configuration of memory-mapped control registers in the I2C, it is highly recommended that software implement a test to confirm proper operation of all control register writes. To support this software test, it is highly recommended to configure the target memory space as a strongly ordered, non-bufferable memory region. This ensures that the register write has completed before the read back is initiated.

#### **4.3.20 General-Purpose Input/Output (GPIO)**

The GPIO module provides digital input capture and digital input/output. There is no processing function in this block. The GPIO is typically used for static or rarely changed outputs, such as transceiver enable signals, and so forth. The GPIO can also be used to provide external interrupt input capabilities.

##### **4.3.20.1 Software Test of Function Using I/O Checking**

A software test can be utilized to test basic functionality as well as to inject diagnostic errors and check for proper error response. Such a test can be executed at boot or periodically. Software requirements necessary are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of a boot time software test of basic functionality is highly recommended. The use of a periodic software test of basic functionality reporting is optional.

The GPIO module does not support a distinct I/O loopback mode. However, it is possible to support I/O checking using normal functionality. To do this software generates output and reads back and checks for the same value in the input registers. For best results, any tests of the GPIO functionality should include the I/O loopback.

##### **4.3.20.2 Information Redundancy Techniques**

Information redundancy techniques can be applied via software as an additional runtime diagnostic on GPIO function. There are many techniques that can be applied, such as multiple inputs and read back of output with an input channel. Signals from many other peripherals can be used as GPIO if not used for primary function. Use of a GPIO module signal and a non GPIO module signal for multi-channel implementation can reduce probability of common mode failures.

Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of information redundancy techniques on GPIO functions is highly recommended.

##### **4.3.20.3 Periodic Read Back of Configuration Registers**

Periodic read back of configuration registers can provide a diagnostic for inadvertent writes or disturb of these registers. Error response, diagnostic testability, and any necessary software requirements are defined by the software implemented by the system integrator. The use of read back of configuration registers mechanism is recommended.

##### **4.3.20.4 Software Read Back of Written Configuration**

In order to ensure proper configuration of memory-mapped control registers in the GPIO, it is highly recommended that software implement a test to confirm proper operation of all control register writes. To support this software test, it is highly recommended to configure the target memory space as a strongly ordered, non-bufferable memory region. This ensures that the register write has completed before the read back is initiated.

##### **4.3.20.5 Notes**

To reduce probability of common mode failure, the user should consider implementing multiple channels using non adjacent pins.

## 5 Other System and Software Level Diagnostics

TDA2x devices do include a varied and rich set of peripherals and processing elements that allow customer systems to program and run system level diagnostics. These diagnostics can be designed to achieve higher levels of safety and robustness at system level. Depending upon the system level safety objectives, development teams can design their own diagnostics as well. The FMEDA tool allows you to insert your own diagnostic and expected coverage to calculate the effective ISO26262 metrics.

FMEDA already suggests the following software level diagnostics that can be designed and deployed at run time (see [Table 2](#)). The detailed sequence of the diagnostics should be referred to from the technical reference manual.

**Table 2. System With Software Level Diagnostics**

Suggested Software Diagnostic	Description	Objective of the diagnostic	Suggested sequence
Sys_diag_Lock Step	Software based lockstep processing	Ensure complete diagnostic coverage of all computations on CPUs	Design software and functions such that they are run more than once with results' comparison
Sys_diag_End to End	CRC for the data being transferred on the chip	Ensure integrity of the data transfer between various memory locations on the chip	Calculate CRC of data block at source, transfer data, calculate CRC at destination
Sys_diag_L3 L4 Firewall	Memory protection diagnostic	Memory integrity, isolation and freedom from interference	Configure the L3 and L4 interconnect firewalls to protect memory regions and memory pages from different tasks
CLKMON_TEST	Monitor clock quality	Clock quality	Route clock out of the chip on SYS_CLKOUT pins and measure clock quality
DDR1	DDR memory test on DDR1	Confirm that the DDR1 pins and memory is operating correctly	Write to DDR in March pattern, read back and compare for correctness, ensure through the patterns that all address bits are toggled
DDR2	DDR memory test on DDR2	Confirm that the DDR2 pins and memory is operating correctly	Write to DDR in March pattern, read back and compare for correctness, ensure through the patterns that all address bits are toggled
FPGA1	Test connections with FPGA	Test the connections to the FPGA. Ensure integrity of the data being transferred b/w FPGA and TDA2x	System dependent
GPIO1	GPIO pin test	Test the GPIO pin connections	Write through a GPIO both 1 and 0. Configure the IO pad to receive data and confirm that the data received is correct
GPMC1	GPMC memory and pin test	Test the GPMC pin connections	Read from Flash memory. Compare against expected data through ELM or another software mechanism.
I2C1	I2C pin test	Test the I2C pin connection	System level test. Send data on I2C interface. Read it back and compare periodically.
I2C2	I2C pin test	Test the I2C pin connection	System level test. Send data on I2C interface. Read it back and compare periodically.
MCASP2	MCASP pin test	Test the MCASP pin connection	System level test. Send data on MCASP interface. Read it back and compare periodically.
MCASP3	MCASP pin test	Test the MCASP pin connection	System level test. Send data on MCASP interface. Read it back and compare periodically.
MCASP4	MCASP pin test	Test the MCASP pin connection	System level test. Send data on MCASP interface. Read it back and compare periodically.
MCASP5	MCASP pin test	Test the MCASP pin connection	System level test. Send data on MCASP interface. Read it back and compare periodically.
MMC1	MMC memory and pin test	Test the MMC pin connections	Read from Flash memory. Compare against expected data through ELM or another software mechanism
NMIN_TEST	NMIN pin test	NMIN pin test	Test the NMIN pin is toggling



**Table 2. System With Software Level Diagnostics (continued)**

<b>Suggested Software Diagnostic</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Objective of the diagnostic</b>	<b>Suggested sequence</b>
PCIE1	PCIE pin test	PCIE pin test	PCIE read and write integrity sequence on software
PORZ_TEST	Glitch diagnostic on PORZ	Glitch diagnostic on PORZ pin	Glitch gobble on the PORZ pin helps remove glitches from this line
RESETN_TEST	Glitch diagnostic on RESETN	Glitch diagnostic on RESETN pin	Internal pull up on the line helps remove glitches
RESETOUT_TEST	diagnostic on RESETOUT	RSTOUT pin test	Test that device is able to send a RESETOUT on the pin
RTC_ISO	Diagnotic on the isolation mechanism	ISO mechanism is working on RTC	Test that the isolation mechanism of RTC domain is operational
RTC_PORZ	Diagnotic on the RTC PORZ mechanism	PORZ is working on RTC domain	Test that RTC domain PORZ mechanism is working
USB1	USB pin test	Test the USB connection	USB read and write integrity sequence on software
USB2	USB pin test	Test the USB connection	USB read and write integrity sequence on software
VOLTAGEMONITOR_TEST	Monitor voltages	Ensure that voltages are in the allowed range of the datasheet	Deploy system level ADCs to ensure that voltages are in the correct range

## 6 Summary of Diagnostic Features

### Summary of Diagnostic Features

Device partition	Identifier	Diagnostic feature	Recommendation TDA2x <sup>(1)</sup>
Power supply	PWR1	Voltage monitoring using ADC. The voltage monitoring point should be tied to the ADC input on the boundary	NA
	PWR2	External voltage supervisor	M
	PWR3	Voltage sequence and current transient response during power up and shut down should match the data manual descriptions	M
	PWR4	Software readback of PRCM configuration - power domain settings	++
Clock	CLK1	Utilize DCC module to measure the quality of the critical clocks (including PLL input or output clocks).	NA
	CLK2	PLL clock slip or recalibration detector for reference clock or PLL lock loss	++
	CLK3	External clock monitoring using CLKOUT signal	++
	CLK4	Internal watchdog	M
	CLK5	Internal window watchdog	NA
	CLK6	External watchdog	++
	CLK7	software readback of PRCM configuration - clock	++
	CLK8	Clock monitoring using internal 32K OSC as reference	+
Reset	RST1	External monitoring of RSTOUT signal	++
	RST2	Check the reason for last reset	++
	RST3	Glitch filtering on the reset pins	M
	RST4	External watchdog	++
	RST5	software generated warm resets	++
	RST6	Software readback of PRCM configuration - reset	++
System control	SYS1	Software readback of the control module configuration	++
	SYS2	Block control module access through firewall to ensure freedom from interference	++
	SYS3	Use module lock/unlock codes to access control module	++
DSP processor	DSP1	Self test of DSP logic and memory using TeSOC	NA
	DSP2	Traps for illegal operations and instructions	++
	DSP3	Enable FFI using user/supervisor modes of DSP	++
	DSP4	Enable FFI using memory management unit and MPU on XMC	++
	DSP5	Assign an internal watchdog for the processes running on DSP	++
	DSP6	Assign an external watchdog for the processes running on DSP	O
	DSP7	Software (periodic) readback of the DSP and IDMA configuration	O
	DSP8	Parity protection on L1P cache	++
	DSP9	SECEDED ECC protection on L2 SRAM and cache	++
	DSP10	Bypass L1D cache or implement s/w measures to protect safety critical data in L1D	++
	DSP11	Assign an internal window watchdog for the processes running on DSP	NA
	DSP12	Enable software redundancy of safety critical processes through 2 DSP processors	O
	DSP13	Non destructive SW based runtime test library for cheking ALU, memory and cache	+

<sup>(1)</sup> NA = Not available/applicable, M = Mandatory, O = Optional, + = Recommended, ++ = Strongly recommended.

### Summary of Diagnostic Features (continued)

Device partition	Identifier	Diagnostic feature	Recommendation TDA2x <sup>(1)</sup>
M4 processor	IPU1	Traps for illegal operations and instructions	++
	IPU2	ECC protection on the unified cache	NA
	IPU3	MMUs (AMMU and L2 MMU) to ensure that safety critical data can be assigned their own cacheable or non-cacheable region	++
	IPU4	software based testing of MMU operation	++
	IPU5	Assign an internal watchdog for the processes running on M4	++
	IPU6	Assign an external watchdog for the processes running on M4	O
	IPU7	2 independent processors available for redundant checking operations	O
	IPU8	Self test of IPU logic and memory using TeSOC	++
	IPU9	Software (periodic) readback of the IPU configuration	O
	IPU10	Non destructive SW based runtime test library for checking ALU, memory and cache	+
A15 processor	CPU1	MMU to ensure that safety critical data can be assigned their own cacheable or non-cacheable regions	O
	CPU2	Virtualization features to enable hypervisor-based isolation mechanisms	O
	CPU3	Assign an internal window watchdog for the processes running on CPU	O
	CPU4	Assign an external window watchdog for the processes running on CPU	O
	CPU5	2 independent processors available for redundant checking operations	O
	CPU6	Software (periodic) readback of the CPU configuration	O
	CPU7	Traps for illegal operations and instructions	O
	CPU8	Non destructive SW based runtime test library for checking ALU, memory and cache	+
EVE processor	EVE1	Traps for illegal operations and instructions	++
	EVE2	SECDED ECC protection on DMEM, WBUF, IBUF & double error detect on program \$	++
	EVE3	MMU to ensure that safety critical data can be assigned their own cacheable or non-cacheable region	++
	EVE4	Assign an internal watchdog for the processes running on EVE	++
	EVE5	Assign an external watchdog for the processes running on EVE	O
	EVE6	Enable locking mechanisms for the EVE control registers	++
	EVE7	Hardware assisted MISR self test at run time	+
	EVE8	Software (periodic) readback of the EVE configuration	++
	EVE9	Self test of EVE logic and memory using TeSOC	NA
L3 interconnect	ICN1	Periodic software self test to ensure that the DMA and interconnect paths are operating correctly	++
	ICN2	Timeout monitoring	++
	ICN3	Enable error handling for firewall, flag mux or slave NIUs	+
	ICN4	Software (periodic) readback of the interconnect configuration	++
On-chip RAM	OCM1	ECC protection on the on chip memory	++
GP timer	TIM1	Use redundant timers available on chip for safety critical scenario	++
	TIM2	Software (periodic) readback of the timer configuration	++
Inter-processor communication	IPC1	Test patterns can be developed by the user to test the functionality of the mailboxes at startup or shutdown.	+
	IPC2	Assign an internal watchdog for the processes utilizing spinlock or mailbox mechanisms to protect against transient errors that may result in false events	++
	IPC3	Software (periodic) readback of the Mailbox and/or spinlock configuration	++

### Summary of Diagnostic Features (continued)

Device partition	Identifier	Diagnostic feature	Recommendation TDA2x <sup>(1)</sup>
SPI	SPI1	Software based SPI testing	+
	SPI2	Embed signatures in SPI software layers to check for correctness of safety critical data transfer	++
	SPI3	Software (periodic) readback of the peripheral configuration	++
	SPI4	Utilize L4 firewall to safeguard (FFI) SPI configuration space	++
CAN	CAN1	ECC protection on CAN message buffers	NA
	CAN2	Use signatures embedded in CAN packet to check for correctness of safety critical data transfer	++
	CAN3	Software (periodic) readback of the peripheral configuration	++
	CAN4	Utilize L4 firewall to safeguard (FFI) CAN configuration space	
DDR	DDR1	Enable ECC data checking on all DDR accesses	++
	DDR2	Software (periodic) readback of the peripheral configuration	++
	DDR3	Enable performance counters. Read the counters within FTTI to ensure that the data traffic is as expected.	++
DMA	DMA1	Use active and proxy memory protection techniques to ensure safe data transfers with FFI	++
	DMA2	Enable error handling for invalid access patterns	++
	DMA3	Enable redundant data transfer (software driven) followed by checking for safety critical data that is sensitive to single bit flips	++
	DMA4	Software (periodic) readback of the DMA configuration	++
	DMA5	Software (periodic) readback of the param memory configuration	++
I2C	I2C1	Software based I2C testing	+
	I2C2	Enable redundant read check followed by write in I2C software layers for safety critical data	++
	I2C3	Software (periodic) readback of the peripheral configuration	++
VIP	VIP1	Embed signatures in VIP software layers to check for correctness of safety critical data transfer	++
	VIP2	Software (periodic) readback of the peripheral configuration	++
	VIP3	Check width and height of captured frames and match with the desired value	++
	VIP4	Check for sensor frame freeze through checksum comparisons for full or partial windows	++
DSS	DSS1	Enable frame freeze checks based on software (use DSP or CRC h/w*) for display safety critical applications	++
	DSS2	Software (periodic) readback of the peripheral configuration	++
GPIO	GPIO1	Enable redundant GPIOs based connections for safety critical events	++
	GPIO2	Software (periodic) readback of the peripheral configuration	++
TeSOC	TSOC1	Enable self test for M4	NA
	TSOC2	Enable self test for EVE	NA
	TSOC3	Enable self test for DSP	NA
	TSOC4	Enable self test for DSS memories	NA
	TSOC5	Enable self test for VIP memories	NA
	TSOC6	Enable self test for ISS memories	NA
MCRC	CRC1	Use CRC hardware accelerator for checking safety critical data transfer	NA
	CRC2	Test the CRC module to ensure that it is working correctly by utilizing the s/w APIs for known data blocks	NA
	CRC3	Software (periodic) readback of the CRC configuration	NA
DCC	DCC1	Use DCC to monitor the clock accuracy for various safety critical clocks	NA
	DCC2	Self test DCC using a s/w mechanism. This can be either achieved by configuring DCC to monitor for a different clock frequency, while the reference clock selected is incorrect	NA

### Summary of Diagnostic Features (continued)

Device partition	Identifier	Diagnostic feature	Recommendation TDA2x <sup>(1)</sup>
ESM	ESM1	Utilize the ESM functionality to assert errors external to the SOC	NA
	ESM2	Utilize the ESM functionality to assert errors to internal SOC processors	NA
	ESM3	Self test for ESM	NA
ADC	ADC1	Use interrupt based ADC to monitor external voltage, clocks temperatures	NA
	ADC2	Self test for ADC by comparing Vref to itself on one of the ADC lines	NA

## 7 References

- *TDA2x ADAS Applications Processor 23mm Package (ABC Package) Data Manual* (SPRS859)
- *TDA2x ADAS Applications Processor Silicon Revision 1.1 Technical Reference Manual* (SPRUHK5)
- *Cortex-M4 Technical Reference Manual* located at <http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.subset.cortexm.m4/index.html#cortexm4>
- TMS320C66x DSP Megamodule Reference Guide

## Development Interface Agreement

A Development Interface Agreement (DIA) is intended to capture an agreement between a customer and supplier towards the management of shared responsibilities in developing a functional safety system. In custom developments, the DIA is a key document executed between customer and supplier early in the development process. As the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device family is a commercial, off the shelf (COTS) product, TI has prepared a standard DIA within this section that describes the support that TI can provide for customer developments. Requests for custom DIAs should be referred to your local TI sales office for disposition.

### A.1 Appointment of Safety Managers

Texas Instruments has not appointed a Safety Manager for the development of the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device family. The component is a Quality Managed device.

### A.2 Tailoring of the Safety Lifecycle

The development of the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device family does not follow the requirements outlined by ISO26262:2011. TI's standard DSP development flow has been followed.

### A.3 Activities Performed by TI

The TI DSP products covered by this DIA are hardware components not developed with any safety standard in mind. System level architecture, design, and safety analysis are not in scope of TI activities and are the responsibility of the TI customer.

**Table 3. Activities Performed by TI vs Performed by Customer**

Safety Lifecycle Activity	TI Execution	SEooC Customer Execution
Management of functional safety	No	Yes
Definition of end equipment and item	No	Yes
Hazard and risk analysis of end equipment and item	No	Yes
Development of end equipment safety concept	Assumptions made	Yes
Allocation of end equipment requirements to subsystems, hardware components, and software components	Assumptions made	Yes
Definition of DSP safety requirements	No	No
DSP architecture and design execution	Yes	No
DSP level safety analysis	No	No
DSP level verification and validation	Yes	No
Integration of DSP into end equipment	Support provided	Yes
End equipment level safety analysis	No	Yes
End equipment level verification and validation	No	Yes
End equipment level safety assessment	Support provided	Yes
End equipment release to production	No	Yes
Management of safety issues in production	Support provided	Yes

## A.4 Information to be Exchanged

In a custom development, there is an expectation under ISO 26262 that all development documents related to work products are made available to the customer. In a COTS product, this approach is not sustainable. TI has summarized the most critical development items into a series of documents that can be made available to customers either publicly or under a non-disclosure agreement (NDA). NDAs are required in order to protect proprietary and sensitive information disclosed in certain safety documents.

[Table 4](#) summarizes the product safety documentation that TI can provide to customers to assist in development of safety systems.

**Table 4. Product Safety Documentation**

Deliverable Name	Contents	Confidentiality	Availability
Safety Product Review	Overview of safety considerations in product development and product architecture. Delivered ahead of public product announcement	NDA Required	Not circulated as product is already released to market and Safety Manual is available
Safety Manual	User guide for the safety features of the product, including system level assumptions of use	NDA Required	Available
Safety Analysis Report Summary for the VisionSurround28 Super/High/Mid device family	Summary of FIT rates and device safety metrics according to ISO 26262 at device level	NDA Required	In Development
Safety Case Report	Summary of the conformance of the product to the ISO 26262 standard	NDA Required	Not planned
Safety Case Database	Clause by clause detail of compliance to ISO 26262 standards	NDA Required	Not planned

## A.5 Parties Responsible for Safety Activities

TI has not developed the product according to the ISO26262 standard requirements but as a COTS product. No specific safety activities have been performed.

## A.6 Supporting Processes and Tools

TI uses a variety of tools and corresponding data formats for internal and external documents. The tools and data formats that are relevant to the safety related documents shared with SEooC customers are noted in [Table 5](#).

Apart from these any updates to the safety architecture or reports should be communicated through the CDDS system to all the customer stakeholders. The customer project managers are advised to ensure that the right stakeholders do have the CDDS portal access that can be enabled through your concerned CPM (Customer Program Manager).

**Table 5. Product Safety Documentation Tools and Formats**

Deliverable Name	Creation Tools	Output Formats
Safety Product Preview	N/A	N/A
Safety Manual	XML	Adobe PDF
Safety Analysis Report Summary	XML. Microsoft Excel	Adobe PDF, Microsoft Excel 2003
Safety Case Report	N/A	N/A
Safety Case Database	N/A	N/A



### **A.7 Supplier Hazard and Risk Assessment**

Hazard and risk assessments under ISO 26262 are targeted at the system level of abstraction. When developing a hardware component out of context, the system implementation is not known. Therefore TI has not executed a system hazard and risk analysis. Instead, TI has made assumptions that are fed into the component design. The ultimate responsibility to determine if the TI component is suitable for use in the system rests on the system integrator.

### **A.8 Creation of Functional Safety Concept**

The functional safety concept under ISO 26262 is targeted at the system level of abstraction. When developing a hardware component out of context, the system implementation is not known. Therefore, TI cannot generate a system functional safety concept. Instead, TI has made assumptions that have been fed into the component design. The ultimate responsibility to determine if the TI component is suitable for use in the system rests on the system integrator.

## Revision History

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Only those TI components which TI has specifically designated as military grade or "enhanced plastic" are designed and intended for use in military/aerospace applications or environments. Buyer acknowledges and agrees that any military or aerospace use of TI components which have **not** been so designated is solely at the Buyer's risk, and that Buyer is solely responsible for compliance with all legal and regulatory requirements in connection with such use.

TI has specifically designated certain components as meeting ISO/TS16949 requirements, mainly for automotive use. In any case of use of non-designated products, TI will not be responsible for any failure to meet ISO/TS16949.

### Products

Audio	<a href="http://www.ti.com/audio">www.ti.com/audio</a>
Amplifiers	<a href="http://amplifier.ti.com">amplifier.ti.com</a>
Data Converters	<a href="http://dataconverter.ti.com">dataconverter.ti.com</a>
DLP® Products	<a href="http://www.dlp.com">www.dlp.com</a>
DSP	<a href="http://dsp.ti.com">dsp.ti.com</a>
Clocks and Timers	<a href="http://www.ti.com/clocks">www.ti.com/clocks</a>
Interface	<a href="http://interface.ti.com">interface.ti.com</a>
Logic	<a href="http://logic.ti.com">logic.ti.com</a>
Power Mgmt	<a href="http://power.ti.com">power.ti.com</a>
Microcontrollers	<a href="http://microcontroller.ti.com">microcontroller.ti.com</a>
RFID	<a href="http://www.ti-rfid.com">www.ti-rfid.com</a>
OMAP Applications Processors	<a href="http://www.ti.com/omap">www.ti.com/omap</a>
Wireless Connectivity	<a href="http://www.ti.com/wirelessconnectivity">www.ti.com/wirelessconnectivity</a>

### Applications

Automotive and Transportation	<a href="http://www.ti.com/automotive">www.ti.com/automotive</a>
Communications and Telecom	<a href="http://www.ti.com/communications">www.ti.com/communications</a>
Computers and Peripherals	<a href="http://www.ti.com/computers">www.ti.com/computers</a>
Consumer Electronics	<a href="http://www.ti.com/consumer-apps">www.ti.com/consumer-apps</a>
Energy and Lighting	<a href="http://www.ti.com/energy">www.ti.com/energy</a>
Industrial	<a href="http://www.ti.com/industrial">www.ti.com/industrial</a>
Medical	<a href="http://www.ti.com/medical">www.ti.com/medical</a>
Security	<a href="http://www.ti.com/security">www.ti.com/security</a>
Space, Avionics and Defense	<a href="http://www.ti.com/space-avionics-defense">www.ti.com/space-avionics-defense</a>
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